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Sugar exporters of the Caribbean depend on preferential sales of sugar to the European 
Union and United States at prices which are two to three times the world market price. 
Without these preferences, sugar export revenues would decline significantly. These 
preferences are likely to erode in the next several years as the sugar programs of both the 
European Union and United States are under pressure to reform as part of already agreed 
international commitments, internal pressures, and the ongoing Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The European Commission has proposed reforms that 
would reduce internal sugar prices by 36 percent, directly affecting Caribbean sugar 
exporters. This presents a serious challenge to the sugar producers of the Caribbean who 
are mostly high-cost producers who will find it difficult to compete in the world market. 
St. Kitts & Nevis have recently announced plans to close their sugar industry and 
Trinidad & Tobago began a major restructuring program in 2003. Other sugar producers 
of the Caribbean will need to become more competitive by reducing costs and adding 
value to their sugar industries through cogeneration of energy and other activities. Those 
that cannot reduce costs sufficiently will need to diversify into other crops, such as fruits, 
vegetables, and meats for the growing local demand, the tourist industry, or export. 
International assistance will be important to help countries with these adjustments and the 
European Union has already proposed an adjustment program.    3
 



































Sugar is still an important industry for countries of the Caribbean region,
1 
although its economic importance has diminished over time as tourism, construction, and 
services have increased. Sugar still accounts for more than 20 percent of the merchandise 
exports of Belize, Guyana, and St. Kitts & Nevis, and roughly 10 percent of employment 
in these countries. It occupies an average of 31 percent of the cropland in the region and 
more than 60 percent of the cropland in Barbados, St. Kitts & Nevis, and Trinidad & 
Tobago (Table 1). It provides jobs to the rural poor who often lack the skills or training to 
find employment in other sectors. Its importance extends beyond its direct economic 
contribution, as it also provides attractive vistas and sight-seeing opportunities for 
tourists. It is an important part of the history and culture of the region, and it is important 
to the environment because it protects the soil from erosion during heavy rains and 
occasional hurricanes. This important industry faces major challenges and an uncertain 
future in the Caribbean.  
 


































Bahamas      6,200             5    35.1    14,960 
Barbados    54,532    51,187  2.0  63.4  9.5    9,250 
Belize  115,218  106,677  12.5  43.0  20.1    3,110 
Dominica         400           38    1.2     
Dominican 
Republic 
439,329   199,630    27.3  9.5    2,130 
Guyana  293,072    271,626  6.0  22.8  24.0      860 
Haïti      8,333              0     1.9        510 
Jamaica  205,000    167,996  2.5  32.0  5.4  2,610 
St. Kitts & 
  Nevis 
  19,026     14,472  7.0  77.1  22.1  6,570 
St. Vincent/ 
Grenadines 
    1,600              0    4.4    2,720 
Suriname      9,000               0     4.7    1,890 
Trinidad &  
 Tobago 
  96,068      69,475  8.0  64.0  1.0  4,930 
   Region  1,241,177    881,107    31.4  3.7   
Sources: Sugar production and exports are in tons of raw sugar from FAOSTAT. The sugar sector’s share of national 
employment is calculated relative to the labor force using various sources of sugar sector field and factory employment 
and labor force figures from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. The share of cropland planted to sugar cane is 
computed from FAOSTAT data. The share of merchandise exports from sugar is from FAOSTAT. The gross national 
income per capita is from the Development Indicators, 2002, Tables 1.1 and 1.6. Blanks indicate that data was not 
available. 
                                                 
1 The Caribbean region in this report refer to the countries included in the World Bank’s regional 
classification which includes the following countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.   2
 
  The sugar industries of the Caribbean have been in decline since at least the 
1970s, and repeated efforts to revitalize them have not been successful. Production and 
exports have declined by about half since 1970 (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Caribbean Sugar Production, Consumption, Exports and Imports, 1970-2003 
   
Source: FAOSTAT data and authors calculations. 
 
Domestic consumption has increasingly been satisfied by imports rather than 
production. Costs per unit of production have increased due to rising wages, deteriorating 
field and factory performance, and inefficiencies which have come with public sector 
control and management. Untimely strikes and high rates of absenteeism have further 
contributed to the deterioration of the sugar industries. Labor for undesirable tasks, such 
as cane cutting, is increasingly difficult to obtain and temporary workers for these jobs 
are often brought in from other countries. Losses accumulated over many years have led 
to large debts that further add to the cost of operation and limit capital for modernization.  
While the situation varies by country, most of the Caribbean’s sugar producers 
would not be operating without preferential access to the EU and U.S. sugar markets that 
pay two to three times world market prices for imports from quota holders. These 
preferences have eroded over time as the quantities of imports have declined, especially 
in the United States. Further erosion is expected as the EU and U.S. face internal and 
external pressures for reform of their sugar programs. The quantities of EU and U.S. 
imports are now largely bound by international agreements, but the prices are not bound 
and are expected to decline with reforms. Many Caribbean countries have abandoned 
their U.S. quotas because they do not produce enough sugar to meet both their EU and 
U.S. quotas and the EU quotas have higher prices. Some countries, such as Barbados, 
have had their EU quotas reduced and assigned to other countries because they did not 
meet them. Despite this, export earnings for the Caribbean region still averaged US$406 
million during 1999-2001 and 60 percent of these earnings were due to preferential 
access to the EU and U.S. sugar markets.  
  While production costs have increased and production and exports have fallen in 
many Caribbean countries, the opposite has occurred in many other sugar producing 
countries. World sugar production costs have declined by about 40 percent (real terms) 
since 1980 (LMC International, 2001), as production has increased most rapidly in low-
cost producers such as Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, South Africa, and 
Thailand. The combined share of world exports of these low-cost producers has increased 
from 24 to 52 percent since 1980.  













































  Most of the Caribbean sugar industries will need to be restructured, and some will 
need to be closed. If this is not done, they face ongoing losses that will increase as 
preferences erode. Since most of the sugar industries of the region are state-owned 
enterprises, the governments must ultimately pay for the losses. Sugar industries in a few 
countries in the region, such as Guyana and Belize, are expected to survive with lower 
preferences. And some portion of other sugar industries in the region could be viable if 
properly restructured to include only the best sugar producing lands and factories. In 
Jamaica, for example, two private sector estates are profitable and could survive with 
lower preferences while much of the state-owned industry could not survive, even now, 
without government subsidies and would probably not be able to adjust to lower 
preferences. The Jamaican government has announced that it will close two of its state-
owned sugar factories (F.O. Lichts 2005). 
Sugar policies often adversely affect consumers. Many Caribbean countries have 
regulated sugar prices or high tariffs that increase the cost of sugar to consumers. For 
example, Jamaican consumers paid more than double the retail prices of consumers in 
Belize, Dominican Republic and Guyana (Figure 2), and slightly higher retail sugar 
prices than consumers in the European Union in 2002. 
 

















      Source: International Sugar Organization 2003. 
 
Government officials of Caribbean countries have been reluctant to close or 
rationalize their sugar industries because of the economic and social impact of such 
actions. Sugar is still a significant employer and export earner of many countries, and 
financial and technical assistance will be needed to help these countries make the 
transition from a sugar industry dependent on preferential access to the EU and U.S. 
sugar markets to a more diversified agricultural sector which produces high-valued 
products to meet the demands of the tourist industry or for export. The European Union 
has proposed a program of assistance. The international donor community as a whole 









Belize Dominican Rep. Guyana Jamaica Trinidad &
Tobago  4
Caribbean countries should prepare a comprehensive transition program in a timely 
manner to help mobilize assistance.  
While most governments in the region continue to support their sugar industries, 
the Government of Trinidad & Tobago recently began a major restructuring and 
privatization program of the state-owned sugar company, Caroni (1975) Limited, which 
had never made a profit in 30 years of operation. The restructuring and privatization 
program may provide a useful model of reform for other countries in the region (see 
Appendix I for a description of the program). The restructuring program provided for 
severance payments and retraining for workers, privatization of cane growing, closing of 
one of the two factories, redevelopment of some sugar cane lands for residential and 
commercial uses, the sale of non-sugar activities, and the creation of a new sugar 
company with reduced assets and a more limited scope of activities. Past debts of the 
sugar company were assumed by the government and will be partially offset by the sale 
of assets and land of the former company. The cost of the restructuring was estimated at 
TT$1.5 billion (US$ 240 million), compared with annual losses of TT$0.5 billion (US$ 
80 million). The former employees appear generally satisfied with their severance 
payments and retraining programs. Other countries may not be able to fund such an 
extensive restructuring program, but they will need to design their own programs to deal 
with the restructuring of their sugar industries into viable industries that can survive with 





  Trade preferences in sugar have been granted by the European Union under the 
Lomé Convention since 1975 and by the United States under its sugar program since 
1982. These preferences allow quota-holding countries to export sugar up to the amount 
of their quota and receive prices that are based on the prices received by domestic 
producers in the EU and U.S. These internal prices have historically been substantially 
higher than prices in the world market (Figure 3). In 2003, the EU intervention price was 
more than three times the world price and the U.S. producer’s price was more than 
double the world price. In addition to these preferences, countries in the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME)
2 have duty-free access while imports of raw sugar 
from outside the region face a 40 percent Common External Tariff (CET). Refined sugar 
does not have a CET and tariffs vary among countries. However, there is a CARICOM 
provision which triggers a CET of 40 percent once the region produces at least 75 percent 
of its own requirements of refined sugar (Government of Jamaica 2003, page 16). 
 
                                                 
2 The Caribbean Community and Common Market were established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas on 4 
July, 1973.   By Treaty revisions, effective February 2002, the successor entity is now the Caribbean 
Community, including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).  Member countries include: 
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago.  The Bahamas and Haiti are members of the Community but not the Single Market and Economy. 
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Source: World Bank. 
 
The EU Sugar Program 
 
The EU sugar trade preference program has two parts; the ACP-EU Sugar 
Protocol (SP) and the Special Preference Sugar Program (SPS). The ACP-EU Sugar 
Protocol, was established in 1975 under the Lomé Convention to grant preferential access 
to 46 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) with colonial or 
historical ties plus a special allocation for India. The ACP-EU Sugar Protocol of the 
Lomé Convention provided for imports of specified quantities of cane sugar, raw or 
white, which originated in the ACP states at guaranteed prices. Unlike most Articles of 
the Lomé Convention, the Sugar Protocol does not expire and cannot be changed 
unilaterally. The original quantities specified were 1,294,700 tons of white sugar 
equivalents, and an additional amount was allotted to India. The total import commitment 
was for 1,304,700 tons and this amount has remained constant with reallocation of quotas 
among existing members when a country did not fulfill its quota. The sugar imported 
under the Lomé Convention is known as ‘Preference Sugar’ or ‘SP’ sugar. The quantities 
specified for all ACP and Caribbean producers under the Lomé Convention are shown in 
Table 2. Notice that Suriname has lost its preference and Trinidad & Tobago have had 
their preference reduced since the original allocation. Barbados has recently had its quota 
reduced because it did not meet its quota due to declining production. While the 
quantities specified in the Lomé Convention cannot be unilaterally changed, the EU can 
unilaterally change the guaranteed price. This could occur as part of a change to the EU 
intervention price or as a change only for ACP sugar quota holders. The European 
Commission has recently proposed reducing the intervention price by 39 percent over 
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Table 2. ACP-EU Sugar Protocol Quotas for All ACP Countries and Caribbean Countries 
(tons white sugar equivalents) 
Country  1975/76 1985/86 2001/02 
  
Barbados      49,300      50,049      50,312 
Belize      39,400      40,104       40,349 
Guyana    157,700    158,935     159,410 
Jamaica    118,300    118,300     118,696 
St. Kitts & Nevis      14,800      15,394       15,591 
Suriname        4,000              0               0 
Trinidad & Tobago      69,000      43,500       43,751 
   Caribbean Region    452,500    426,282     428,109 
      Share of Total (percent)          34.7         32.7           32.8 
ACP  Total  1,304,700 1,304,700 1,304,700 
Source: European Commission. 
 
The second part of the EU sugar trade preference program was introduced in 
1995. Under this program, an additional import allocation of between 200,000 and 
350,000 tons of sugar was made primarily to ACP countries. This sugar was called 
‘Special Preference Sugar’ or SPS sugar, but unlike SP sugar, this allocation was not 
permanent, and the quantities could vary based on EU import needs. The price paid for 
SPS sugar was 85 percent of the SP guaranteed price. The total SPS quota and quotas for 
Caribbean countries are shown in Table 3. The total SPS quota declined by about one-
third from 1995/96 to 2002/03, while quotas to Caribbean countries declined by more 
than 60 percent.  
  The EU committed to allow the Least Developed Countries duty-free access to its 
sugar market by 2009 under its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative approved in 2001. 
These countries produced an average of 2.5 million tons of raw sugar during 2000-2002, 
but only exported 0.4 million tons. Haiti is the only Caribbean country among the Least 
Developed Countries, and it is not currently a sugar exporter. Thus EBA will not directly 
affect Caribbean sugar exporters, but could indirectly affect them if it leads to changes in 
the EU sugar program.  
 
 
Table 3. EU Special Preference Sugar (SPS) Quotas for Caribbean Countries 
(tons in white sugar equivalents) 
 1995/96  1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01  2001/02  2002/03
Barbados    0  2,500 0 0 0 0  0  0
Belize 13,011  8,490 8,233 9,375 10,448 8,067  5,579  5,527
Guyana 51,402  33,446 30,683 39,135 38,569 41,715  22,444  17,111
Jamaica 38,274  25,317 24,600 28,374 37,842 34,868  17,931  18,894
St Kitts & Nevis  5,027  3,401 3,181 0 0 0  0  0
Trinidad & Tobago   14,108  9,233 8,928 10,165 11,488 12,134  6,239  5,658
   Caribbean  121,821  82,387 75,625 87,048 98,347 96,784  52,193  47,190
    Share (%)  35.40  27.83 25.21 26.06 31.06 32.92  24.45  21.72
Total SPS Quotas  344,100  296,000 300,000 334,000 316,621 294,020  213,448  217,298
Source: European Commission. 
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The U.S. Sugar Program 
 
  The U.S. sugar import quota program was introduced in May 1982 as a way to 
restrict imports that would have otherwise prevented the sugar program from providing 
price supports to U.S. producers at higher than world market prices. Under the 1977 Food 
and Agriculture Act, the government was mandated to provide loan rates for sugar beets 
and cane.
3  The 1981 Act established a raw cane sugar loan rate of 18 cents per pound 
and a refined beet sugar loan rate of 22.9 cents per pound. Subsequent legislation, 
including the most recent 2002 farm legislation, maintained the sugar program in much 
the same form as in the 1981 Act. Tariff-rate quotas replaced import quotas in 1990 
following a successful GATT challenge. Import duties of 0.625 cents per pound, raw 
value, were charged for countries granted Most-Favored Nation status by the United 
States, but most quota suppliers were exempt through the Generalized System of 
Preferences or the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The duty on raw sugar imports above the 
tariff-rate quota was 17.62 cents per pound beginning in January 1995 and declined by 
0.45 cents per pound each year until it reached 15.36 cents per pound in 2000. The duty 
on refined sugar above the tariff-rate quota was 18.62 cents per pound in 1995 and 
declined by 0.48 cents per year through 2000 to 16.21 cents per pound. The over-quota 
tariff will remain prohibitive at a world price of about 5 cents per pound (assuming a U.S. 
raw sugar market price of 22 cents per pound and a transportation cost of 1.5 cents per 
pound). The world market raw sugar price averaged 7.1 cents per pound in 2003 and thus 
over-quota imports were not profitable.  
The U.S. total and Caribbean import quotas and tariff-rate quotas are shown in 
Table 4. The import quotas are based on estimated imports needed to meet U.S. 
consumption after allowing for domestic production. Quotas were allocated to 40 
countries based on their export shares during 1975-81. That period was considered to be a 
period when trade was relatively unrestricted. As shown, the quantities of imports have 
declined by more than half since 1982/83 as domestic production has increased and 
alternative sweeteners, such as high-fructose corn syrups (HFCS), have reduced U.S. 
sugar consumption. Legislation passed in 1990 established minimum import levels of 
1.139 metric tons of raw value sugar to allay concerns of quota-holding countries and 
cane processors about further declines in quotas. Of this, 22,000 metric tons were 
reserved for refined sugar. The 1990 legislation provided for an assessment on all sugar 
processed of 0.18 cents per pound of raw cane sugar and 0.193 cents per pound of refined 
beet sugar in an effort to ‘effectively’ reduce the loan rates but that assessment was 
removed in the 2002 legislation.  
 
                                                 
3 Non-recourse commodity loans are used by the U.S. government to support prices of many crops. Under 
the program, farmers who comply with the provisions of each commodity program are allowed to pledge 
their commodity as collateral and obtain a loan from the USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) at 
the specified loan rate per unit for the commodity. The borrower may elect to repay the loan with interest 
within a specified period and re-gain control of the commodity, or default on the loan and provide the 
commodity as payment in full of the loan and interest. The farmer will normally default on the loan if the 
market price is below the level necessary to repay the loan and interest. Thus, the loan rate becomes the 
effective floor price.   8
Table 4.  U.S. Sugar Import Quotas and Tariff-Rate Quotas (tons of raw sugar) 
Country 1982/83 1990/91 2001/02
  
Barbados 17,781 14,239 7,371
Belize 27,942 22,376 11,583
Dominican Republic  447,065 358,013 185,335
Guyana 30,482 24,410 12,636
Haiti 14,969 8,030 7,258
Jamaica 27,942 22,376 11,583
St. Kitts & Nevis  14,969 8,030 7,258
Trinidad & Tobago  17,781 14,239 7,371
  Caribbean Share (%)   22.8 22.5 19.7
Total   2,624,150 2,100,083 1,272,283
Source: USDA 2003. 
 
  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) introduced a new 
dimension to the U.S. sugar program by allowing Mexico unrestricted duty-free access to 
the U.S. sugar market after the phase-in period which ends in fiscal year (FY) 2008. 
NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994, and most trade barriers between Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States were to be eliminated over the subsequent 15 years. The 
NAFTA sugar provisions were altered by a side-letter agreement prior to the start of the 
Agreement. According to the side-letter, Mexico’s low-tier tariff sugar exports to the 
United States were restricted to Mexico’s ‘net surplus production’ of sugar. The net 
surplus was defined as Mexico’s production less consumption of sugar and high-fructose 
corn syrup. From FY 2001 through 2007, Mexico was to have duty-free access to the 
U.S. market for the amount of its surplus, up to a maximum of 250,000 metric tons raw 
value. Beginning in FY 2008, Mexico was to have duty-free access with no quantitative 
limits. The validity of the side-letter agreement was disputed by Mexico, while the 
United States maintained that the side-letter provisions was valid.  
  The side-letter agreement did not change other NAFTA provisions such as the 
phased reduction in the U.S. over-quota tariff of 16 cents per pound by a total of 15 
percent during the first 6 years, and then in a straight line to zero in calendar year 2008. 
The raw sugar over-quota tariff was 9.07 cents per pound in 2002 and it drops about 1.5 
cents per pound each year. If the world raw sugar prices is in the range of 7 cents per 
pound and U.S. raw sugar prices are about 18 cents per pound, Mexican producers would 
benefit from exporting to the U.S. instead of the world market (USDA, 2002). Currently, 
Mexico does not have a large surplus of sugar to export but this could change due to 
increased production or reduced sugar consumption because of imports or production of 
HFCS (which currently has a 20 percent import duty). In future years, the over-quota 
tariff will continue to decrease and could lead to large imports. Mexico has increased 
sugar production from about 3.5 million tons during 1989-91 to 5.2 million during 2000-
02, while consumption has increased from 4.0 to 4.5 million tons (USDA). This could 
lead to various outcomes, and will likely force changes to the U.S. sugar program. For 
example, Mexico could increase imports of HFCS for use in the soft drink industry and 
export displaced sugar to the U.S. 
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Table 5. EU and U.S. Quotas to Caribbean Sugar Producers and Deliveries in 2000/01  
(metric tons) 
  ACP-EU Sugar 
Protocol 
EU Special Preference 
Sugar 
U.S. Sugar  Rest of 
World 
  Quota Deliveries* Quota Deliveries* Quota Deliveries  Exports*
Barbados    50,312     50,312          0         0  7,372          0           0 
Belize    40,349     40,349   8,067  8,067  11,584  11,616  44,237 
Dominican 
Republic 
           0                0          0         0  185,346     181,708  45,522 
Guyana 159,410  159,410  41,715 41,715 12,637  12,755  42,038 
Haiti             0             0          0          0  7,258          0          0 
Jamaica  118,696   118,696  34,868  34,868  11,584          0           0 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis 
  15,591     15,591          0         0    7,258          0           0 
Trinidad 
& Tobago 
  43,751     43,751  12,134  12,134    7,371      7,402         27 
           
Caribbean    428,109  428,109 96,784  96,784 250,410  213,481 131,797 
Source: European Commission, International Sugar Organization, and USDA.  
Note: EU quotas are given in metric tons of white sugar equivalent and U.S. quotas are in metric tons of 
raw sugar equivalent. The standard conversion of raw cane sugar to refined white sugar is 1.087 units of 
raw cane sugar are required to produce 1.0 unit of white sugar. This assumes a standard sugar content of 
cane of 96 percent (96° polarization).  
Deliveries to U.S. are given in the USDA’s Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook Yearbook, while 
deliveries to the EU and the rest of the world are author’s estimates.  
* Authors’ estimate based on International Sugar Organization data.  
 
Caribbean Dependence on Preferences 
 
The sugar exporters of the Caribbean region are very dependent on the EU and 
U.S. sugar programs, with 85 percent of export quantities and 94 percent of export 
revenues coming from these programs in 2000/01 (Table 5). Without these preferences, 
and assuming world prices were unchanged, export revenues would have declined by 60 
percent. The Dominican Republic is totally dependent on the U.S. preferences while most 
countries have both EU and U.S. quotas (Figure 4). Guyana has the largest EU quota and 
sent approximately 80 percent of its exports to the EU during 1998-2002.  
Countries heavily dependent on the EU market also have a large currency risk 
because the guaranteed price is paid in Euros and currencies of the Caribbean region are 
closely aligned or pegged to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the sharp fall in the Euro following its 
introduction in 1999 reduced their export earnings in local currency and the rise of the 
Euro since 2001 increased currency export earnings for sugar. Some countries in the 
region do not hedge their risk and thus have experienced price swings of as much as 30 
percent over a two-year period.  
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 Source:  Comtrade  data. 
 
Risk of Preference Erosion 
 
  The EU and U.S. sugar programs are under substantial pressure for reform and 
these reforms will likely affect the quota holding countries of the Caribbean. These 
reforms are expected to reduce prices for exports, but not the quantities under quota 
because of international agreements. The EU-ACP quotas are bound by the Lomé 
Convention and its successors and are not expected to be reduced beyond the levels 
shown in Table 2 (except when individual countries do not meet their quotas which can 
lead to reallocation of quotas to other ACP countries). However, the EU’s Special 
Preference Sugar imports can be reduced and that program would be phased out under a 
reform proposal by the European Commission. The U.S.’s import quotas shown in Table 
4 are bound by agreements made by the U.S. in the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture and are not expected to be reduced. The prices received for these quotas are 
not bound by agreement and could be changed.  
The pressure for reform of the EU sugar program intensified when the WTO 
released its ruling in August 2004 and upheld the ruling on appeal in April 2005 in the 
dispute case brought by Australia, Brazil and Thailand in 2003. The ruling concluded that 
the EU’s sugar program subsidized exports in excess of the levels agreed in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture. The European Commission released a proposal for 
reform of the EU’s sugar regime in July 2004 which was not acted upon and a subsequent 
proposal on June 22, 2005 (Box 1). The subsequent proposal was in response to the WTO 
initial and appeal ruling and is intended to bring the EU sugar policy into WTO 
compliance. The proposal calls for a 39 percent cut in domestic support prices to be 
phased in over two years. This reduction would apply to both EU producers and ACP 
quota holders. The proposal also called for the phase out of the EU’s Special Preference 
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proposed reforms will face stiff opposition in both the EU and from ACP exporters, it 
likely indicates the direction that EU sugar reforms will take.  
The U.S. sugar program has not received as much pressure for reform as has the 
EU’s sugar regime, but it is expected to face challenges from other U.S. commodity 
producers who receive less support and from WTO negotiations in the Doha Round. It 
also faces internal pressures to reduce prices by food manufactures. If policy reforms 
occur in the U.S. sugar program, it could be as part of the next U.S. Farm Bill which is 
scheduled to take effect in 2007. Other countries, including Japan, also have policies 
which distort domestic markets and provide high levels of protection to producers 
(Mitchell 2004). Such programs are expected to come under scrutiny during the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations, and reform could lead to larger imports and some increase in 
world prices.  
 
fv Box 1: European Commission’s proposal for Reform of the Sugar Regime 
 
The European Commission put forward its proposal for the EU’s sugar regime on June 22, 
2005. The proposal calls for a 39 percent reduction in support prices over two years. The white 
sugar support price would be reduced from EUR 631.9/ton to EUR 385.5/ton and the raw sugar 
support price would be reduced from EUR 523.7/ton to EUR 319.5/ton by the end of the 
transition period. To compensate for the loss of revenue, direct payments would be made to EU 
farmers to cover 60 percent of the income loss. A voluntary restructuring program was proposed 
for sugar companies to exit the industry. The intervention price would be renamed the reference 
price, and a private storage system would replace the intervention system to allow quota sugar to 
be taken off the market if prices fall below the reference price.  
The proposal does not have mandatory production quotas and instead proposed a voluntary 
restructuring scheme for four years to provide incentives for least efficient sugar producers to 
cease production. A and B production quotas were to be combined into a single quota and C 
sugar was to be subject to an unspecified levy to discourage production. C sugar would not be 
exported in order to comply with the WTO ruling. Exports would be limited to the 
approximately 1.3 million tons allowed under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
compared to the 5-6 million tons of surplus production available for export.  
ACP producers would receive an initial assistance plan with EUR 40 million for 2006 as 
part of an eight year scheme with additional assistance for 2006-2013. A broad range of support 
options were proposed to be tailored to the needs of each country identified by the stakeholders 
and integrated into a long term, comprehensive, sustainable strategy.  
The proposal does not specifically mention what would happen to SPS sugar, but the 
previous proposal of the European Commission had said that the Maximum Supply Needs 
instrument, which is the basis of the Special Preference Sugar (SPS) import program, would in 
time no longer be needed and thus SPS imports would be phased out. This would directly affect 
ACP countries that provide about 16 percent of their exports to the EU under this program.  
 
References: 
European Commission Press Release IP/05/776, Brussels, 22 June 2005. 
 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, “Reforming the European 
Union’s Sugar Policy, Update of Impact Assessment,” Brussels 22.6.2005 SEC(2005) 808. 
 
Noble, Joan, “Radical Reform of the EU Sugar Regime Will Bring Lasting Change,” 
F.O. Lichts International Sugar & Sweetener Report, July 5, 2005, Vol. 137, No.20. 
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Competitiveness of Caribbean Producers 
 
Relative sugar production costs for ACP countries are shown in Figure 5 based on 
LMC International’s cane sugar production costs model. The estimated costs are the 
average during 2000-2002 of growing and processing sugar cane, transporting the raw 
sugar to the port, and loading it on the vessel. Costs are shown as an index relative to the 
highest cost prevailing among the world’s leading free market exporters (Australia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, South Africa and Thailand), who between them account 
for approximately 60 percent of the world’s free market exports. This reference cost is 
shown as 100 in Figure 5. According to these estimates, Guyana is the lowest cost 
producer in the Caribbean with costs that are about 50 percent higher than the reference 
followed by Belize with slightly higher costs. Other Caribbean producers, such as St. 
Kitts & Nevis and Barbados, have costs that are more than twice the reference costs, 
while Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago have costs that are more than triple the reference. 
These estimates should be viewed with caution because production costs are dependent 
on many factors, such as weather and exchange rates, and these factors can change 
significantly from one year to another. For example, the period used for the estimates 
does not reflect the current situation in Jamaica because that was the period immediately 
following the failed privatization when production was severely depressed and costs 
extremely high. However, the overall results confirm the high cost nature of the 
Caribbean sugar industry. Based on these relative costs, none of the Caribbean producers 
are competitive with low-cost world producers or major exporters. However, the 
industries in Guyana and Belize are the most competitive in the region and parts of these 
industries may be globally competitive.  
 
Figure 5. Raw Sugar Production Costs of ACP Producers, Average of  
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In an earlier study, LMC International estimated that the average cost of 
producing raw cane sugar by major exporters, was 10.39 U.S. cents per pound during 
1994/95-1998/99, and the average cost of producing refined cane sugar was 14.25 cents 
per pound (Table 6). The estimates covered 63 cane-producing countries rather than only 
ACP countries as shown in Figure 5. LMC bases its estimates on an engineering cost 
approach that accounts for the physical inputs of labor, machinery, fuel, chemicals, and 
fertilizers used in field and factory operations. The estimates are of actual average costs, 
and estimates include the impact of policies that protect producers in certain countries. 
Such cost estimates are useful for comparing average costs of production for different 
countries using a consistent methodology. Actual raw cane sugar prices are provided for 
comparison. 
 
Table 6. Average Costs of Producing Cane Sugar by Categories of Producers, and Actual 
Sugar Prices 1994/95 – 1998/99 
Category  1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
  U.S. cents per pound /1 
Raw  cane  sugar      
  Low cost producers /2    7.43    8.10    8.18    7.78  7.58 
  Major exporters /3  10.37  10.60  10.72  10.52  9.73 
Cane sugar, white equiv.           
  Low cost producers /2  11.02  11.75  11.84  11.41  11.19 
  Major exporters /3  14.23  14.48  14.61  14.38  13.53 
Actual  Market  Prices      
     Raw cane sugar /4  13.53  12.23  11.21  10.71  7.05 
1/ Measured in nominal U.S. cents per pound, ex-mill, factory basis.  2/  Average of five producing regions 
(Australia, Brazil–Center/South, Guatemala, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). 3/ Average of seven countries 
(Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, South Africa, and Thailand).  /4 Raw cane sugar prices are 
is U.S. cents per lb, July-June average of monthly prices, fob Caribbean ports (note that production costs 
are ex-mill while the actual market prices are fob prices). 
Source:  LMC International as reported in Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, Economic Research 
Service, USDA, September 2001. Actual market prices are from World Bank databases. 
 
National average production costs do not reflect cost differences within a country 
and these differences can be substantial. In Jamaica for example, the cost of the private 
sector estates are about one-half of those of the state-owned and managed estates. These 
differences are due partly to variations in natural climatic conditions for sugar cane 
production, but mostly to better management. Thus, it may be possible for part of an 
industry to be competitive while other parts are uncompetitive.  
Most Caribbean sugar industries have accumulated large debts from years of 
unprofitable operation. This debt reduces competitiveness by increasing interest costs, 
constraining equipment maintenance and replacement, and limiting application of 
production inputs such as fertilizer. Deferred equipment maintenance and replacement 
leads to more frequent equipment failure and increases factory downtime. Debt of cane 
growers, in those countries that have private sector cane growers, constrains their ability 
to undertake sugar cane replanting and apply adequate fertilizer, which in turn reduces 
yields and leads to further losses and additional debts. Once begun, debt escalation is 
difficult to escape. In St. Kitts & Nevis, the debt of the sector has accumulated over the 
past 15 years and totaled EC$286 (US$106) million by the end of 2003—40 percent of   14
annual GDP. In Trinidad, the state-owned sugar company, Caroni (1975) Limited, had 
accumulated current and long-term debt of TT$1.5 billion (US$240 million) and total 
debt and liabilities of TT$3.4 billion (US$540 million). In Jamaica, the failed 
privatization effort of 1994 led to the return of six estates/factories to the government 
from 1998-2000 and the assumption of their debts of about J$3.3 billion (US$77 million). 
That did not include the substantial debt of private Jamaican sugar cane farmers. 
The trade regimes in many Caribbean countries are highly protectionist for sugar 
as well as other agricultural products and are another indication of a lack of 
competitiveness. For example, Barbados bound all agricultural tariffs at 100 percent and 
specific products at substantially higher rates during the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture. In addition, a 15 percent VAT and a one percent environmental tax are 
applied to the c.i.f. import price plus tariffs of most agricultural products. The resulting 
total duties and charges approach 300 percent for many agricultural products produced in 
Barbados. The import tariffs have been reduced by the agreed 24 percent over the 10 
years since the Uruguay Round Agreement, but remain high. White sugar imported 
within CARICOM is charged only the 15 percent VAT and the one percent 
environmental tax. Raw cane sugar imports are subject to a sugar levy of B$900 
(US$150/ton), which is equivalent to an 80 percent duty at 2004 prices. The lower duties 
and charges on white sugar reflect the fact that it is not produced in Barbados and all 
domestic sugar consumption is met by imports. Jamaica also has high duties and fees on 
imports. 
The Jamaican Government increased import duties on certain agricultural 
products in 2002. The duties were increased from 86 to 260 percent for poultry products, 
and selected vegetables (fresh or chilled tomatoes, cabbage, lettuce and carrots). Despite 
the high tariffs, food imports continue to rise which indicates the lack of competitiveness 
in many products. Jamaican raw sugar import face a 40 percent CET and a 63 percent 
stamp tax duty for a total import tariff of 128 percent since the stamp duty is also charged 




  With the prospects of preference erosion increasing, Caribbean sugar producers 
who intend to continue producing sugar need to consider ways to improve 
competitiveness by reducing costs and adding value to their output. There are a number 




  Sugar industries in most countries are comprised of several estates each with its 
own cane growing area and factory. Production costs vary among estates due to 
differences in sugar cane growing conditions, and field and factory performance. An 
industry may become more competitive by closing the unprofitable estates and shifting 
resources and equipment to the more profitable estates. This reduces the size of the 
industry, and allows the portion of the industry that remains to be more competitive.  
  The sugar sector restructuring underway in Trinidad & Tobago closed one of the 
two sugar factories. The remaining factory has increased production and reduced per unit   15
costs by operating at the higher output level. Jamaica has developed several plans to 
rationalize the industry and close some factories. Under the proposals, cane production 
would be shifted to remaining factories. The plans are still under consideration but not 
yet agreed. Some Caribbean countries have sugar sectors with only one factory, such as 
St. Kitts & Nevis. Under such conditions it may not be possible to rationalize the industry 




Most of the sugar industries of the Caribbean are state-owned enterprises, which 
world-wide experience has shown, do not perform as well as private sector companies. 
Past efforts to privatize the industries have been unsuccessful. The state-owned Jamaican 
estates were privatized in 1994 but were returned to the government starting in 1998. The 
failed privatization of the Jamaican sugar industry left the industry in a weaker state than 
before and the government still in control. Prospects for privatization are not good 
because the industries are unprofitable and potential buyers are aware of the risk of 
preference erosion. However, a partial privatization may be a more viable option for 
many sugar industries. This was done in Trinidad & Tobago in their recent restructuring 
program. The restructuring privatized cane growing, but not the factory. The factories 
will purchase cane from 6,000 private cane growers producing under contract on owned 
lands or leased company lands. 
The value of private ownership is demonstrated in Jamaica where there are two 
private sector sugar estates and five public sector estates in operation. The private sector 
estates, have higher yields, more sugar produced per ton of cane and per hectare, lower 
labor costs, and less factory down time. One of the private sector estates, Worthy Park, is 
a fourth-generation family-owned company that began operating in 1918. It produces 10 
tons of sugar per hectare of sugar cane land compared to the Jamaican industry average 
of 5 tons per hectare. It has doubled sugar cane production since 1990 while Jamaican 
national production has declined by 30 percent. The large difference between private 
sector and public sector sugar companies’ performance in Jamaica does not bode well for 
the survival of the Caribbean sugar sector in its current public sector dominated form. 
Efforts to improve efficiency of public sector companies have been tried repeatedly and 
often with World Bank involvement. These efforts have generally been unsuccessful in 
their objective of establishing a competitive sector that could operate without government 
support. Instead, they accomplished their immediate goal of preventing a collapse of the 




  While private ownership and management is the preferred model of operation, 
several Caribbean sugar industries have improved performance by hiring professional 
management. The sugar industry in Guyana was nationalized in 1975 and 1976 and went 
into a long period of decline, with production falling from about 350,000 tons in 1974 to 
only 132,000 tons in 1990 (Figure 6). Exports declined from 307,000 tons in 1974 to 
129,000 tons in 1990 and were less than the 164,000 tons that could be sold under quota 
to the European Economic Community and U.S. at preferential prices. In order to arrest   16
the decline of the sugar industry, the government initiated a contract with Booker Tate, a 
private management company, in October 1990 to manage day-to-day operations and 
prepare to rehabilitate the industry. Booker Tate raised wages of field and factory 
workers by 200 percent and installed a new more qualified management team. Production 
responded to better management and good weather and increased to 247,000 tons in 
1992. The country filled its export quotas for the first time in four years (World Bank 
1993). Production has continued to increase and has nearly returned to the levels prior to 
nationalization. 
 






















Nearly all sugar producers are looking for ways to add value to their sugar 
production activities. In a survey done in 2001, LMC International found that sugar 
refining, ethanol production from molasses, and power cogeneration from bagasse were 
the most common activities undertaken to add value to sugar production. They also found 
that few sugar companies were successful in exploiting a brand name because of the 
homogeneity of sugar and the reluctance of consumers and industrial users to pay a 
premium for branded sugar. Less common ways to add value were to produce paper or 
particle board from cane residue.  
One of the most promising ways to add value is to produce energy as a byproduct. 
This is currently viewed as attractive because of high energy prices, but it may be viable 
even without recent increases in energy prices because of the combined economic and 
environmental benefits. Sugar cane produces very large volumes of biomass (60-80 tons 
per hectare) and that biomass can be used as a clean burning fuel. It has been used to 
power the sugar factories for decades, but it can also be used to produce surplus 
electricity to meet a portion of the national electricity demand. This is being done in some 
countries (such as India and Mauritius), but not extensively in the Caribbean sugar 
producing countries (Belize and Guyana are reported to be considering such activities). 

























Management Hired  17
the burning of the cane residue (bagasse) or cane tops and field residue in high-efficiency 
boilers. This can be done by upgrading the equipment at sugar factories or using the 
bagasse in combination with coal in existing power generating plants. This latter 
approach requires little modification to existing power plants and benefits from the 
economies of scale of large power plants. The constraints to this approach are the cost of 
transporting the biomass fuel and the willingness of the power company to switch to an 
alternative fuel. If surplus power is generated by upgrading equipment at sugar factories, 
the efficiency is lower, because of the smaller scale of power plant, and large capital 
investments are required. There are substantial environmental advantages to using sugar 
cane bagasse and residue to produce electricity because of the clean burning properties of 
biomass compared to fossil fuels. Fossil fuel burning produces greenhouse gases, such as 
CO2, while burning biomass is considered to have zero CO2 emissions because sugar cane 
absorbs CO2 during growth and releases it during incineration.  
A less viable approach to energy production in the Caribbean is to produce 
ethanol instead of sugar from the sugar cane. The ethanol could then be blended with 
gasoline to obtain a cleaner burning automobile fuel. Brazil has done this since the mid-
1970s, but scaled back the program in the 1990s because it was unprofitable. It has 
recently expanded ethanol production from sugar cane in response to high petroleum and 
low sugar prices. Most Caribbean sugar producers could not profitably switch to ethanol 
without large government subsidies because they are high-cost sugar cane producers. 
There is an opportunity, however, to profitably produce ethanol from imported feedstock 
and export it duty-free to the U.S. under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. But, this would 
not add value to Caribbean sugar industries because it would be wholly outside the sugar 
sector and dependent on low-cost imported feedstock. 
Sugar refining is another way to add value to sugar industries and that is the 
strategy being followed by the reformed sugar company in Trinidad & Tobago. The 
strategy plans to take advantage of the 40 percent CET exemption in the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy for countries within the region. That makes it profitable to 
refine raw cane sugar and export it to countries in the region that lack refining capacity. 
However, the CET is only triggered once the region produces at least 75 percent of its 
own requirement of refined sugar which is currently 175,000 tons (Government of 
Jamaica 2003 page 16). 
 
The Government’s Role 
 
The government can increase the competitiveness of its sugar industry by 
providing an enabling economic environment. This can be done by enacting policies and 
providing public services that allow the sugar industry to operate efficiently. This 
includes; building and maintaining rural roads that are critical for transporting sugar cane, 
providing access to power, fuels, and communications at competitive rates, and providing 
a stable macro economic environment with equitable taxation policies and fairly-valued 
exchange rates. Traditional activities of the public sector also include providing research 
on crop varieties and production practices to increase the competitiveness of the industry. 
Some activities previously provided by the public sector, such as extension to cane 
growers, are now sometimes provided by the private sector based on user fees. Sugar 
companies often provide healthcare and education services for employees, but these   18
services could be provided by the government to reduce the costs of sugar production. 
Experience has shown that the government should not be involved directly in marketing 
and production, since these activities are better done by the private sector.  
 
Diversify Out of Sugar 
 
Those sugar industries that cannot become competitive in sugar need to diversify 
out of sugar and this is being tried in a number of countries with varying levels of 
success. Past efforts to diversify have been constrained by poorly planned, financed and 
executed efforts as well as the ongoing competition from sugar which received high 
preference prices. If sugar preference prices erode, diversification will become a higher 
priority for both the public and private sector and will have better chances to succeed. 
  Efforts to diversify into fresh fruits and vegetables production for the tourist 
hotels or export market have generally been disappointing. Hotels catering to tourists 
need a regular supply of high quality produce which does not have high pesticide residue, 
insect damage, or other problems. Small producers find it difficult to meet such standards 
without large government support. Jamaica has a government program to provide such 
support, but it affects less than 100 farmers. The program was developed by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and is under the direction of the Jamaican Agricultural Society. It has been 
able to overcome some of the problems by closely involving the hotels. Seasonality of 
local production is somewhat reduced by the use of irrigation, and hotels know when 
local produce will be available and they import during other times. High tariffs add to the 
incentives for using local produce since many of the locally produced fruits and 
vegetables have tariffs of as much as 260 percent. 
Despite the limited success of the program in Jamaica, efforts of Caribbean sugar 
producers to diversify into other agricultural crops have generally been unsuccessful. 
Often this was due to inappropriate project design, poor technology, improper 
institutional arrangements, and inadequate funding. The difficulties of diversify within 
the sugar sector are illustrated by the efforts of the Caroni sugar company of Trinidad & 
Tobago.
4 The company was a state-owned enterprise that began efforts to diversify out of 
sugar in the 1970s with the formation of the Sugar Sector Rationalization Committee in 
1978 to be followed by a five-year development plan in 1983-84. The plan called for the 
production of rice, citrus, coffee, corn, livestock, milk, miscellaneous food crops, and 
aquaculture. The labor union opposed the separation of the diversified activities from the 
Caroni sugar company because they feared it would weaken the importance of sugar and 
thus the wages and jobs of union members. Consequently the diversification effort was 
headed by the staff of the sugar company and the projects were activities of the sugar 
company.  This caused two problems. First, the sugar company staff did not have 
expertise in non-sugar activities, and second, the staff were reluctant to have resources 
devoted to non-sugar activities and were not fully supportive of the diversification 
activities. When resources were to be shared between sugar and non-sugar activities, the 
priority went to sugar even if the need was greater in the non-sugar activity. The funding 
of the diversification effort was inadequate and that compromised many of the activities. 
                                                 
4 Based on a presentation by Dr. George Mason, agronomist at Caroni (1975) Limited at the Sugar 
Symposium in St. Kitts & Nevis, April 20, 2004.   19
The citrus plant, for example, was never constructed due to lack of funds and the 
planned-for processing of 85 percent of the crop that could not be consumed fresh, never 
occurred. The selection of planting materials and livestock was rushed once the 
diversification plan was approved with the result that the materials was not well suited to 
the soils and climate, or were of poor quality and were not readily marketable. The coffee 
varieties selected were of poor quality and that activity failed. The sheep project was 
designed for superior breeds available from Barbados, but due to time and budget 
pressures, less desirable local animals were used. Whether the diversification could have 
been done successfully cannot be know, but other countries had similar disappointing 
experiences.  
The World Bank was involved in a diversification effort in Barbados which was 
initially successful but eventually failed. The World Bank had a Technical Assistance 
project with the Ministry of Agriculture in Barbados to support vegetable production and 
marketing in 1982 and an Industrial Credit Project in 1983 to support agro processing. 
This led to a substantial increase in vegetable exports. The implementation completion 
reports were satisfactory (World Bank 1996), but the capacity was lost once the World 
Bank support ended according to Ministry of Agriculture Officials. 
 
The World Sugar Market 
  
  Without the high prices of the preference markets, Caribbean producers would be 
more directly affected by the developments and trends in the world sugar market which 
has a long history of policy distortions that affect price levels and price volatility. These 
distortions have included government guaranteed prices to producers, import tariffs, 
quantitative import controls, and export subsidies. Most often these policies have been 
intended to protect producers from lower cost imports. The highest protection has 
generally occurred in OECD countries such as Japan, the European Union, and the 
United States. This protection has contributed to slower consumption growth, higher 
production, the emergence of alternative sweeteners, reduced net imports or increased net 
exports, and lower world prices. For example, such policies have caused the combined 
net imports of the European Union, Japan, and the United States to decline from one-half 
of world sugar imports in the 1970s to about zero in recent years (Mitchell, 2004). This 
has slowed the growth of world trade and depressed world prices compared to the levels 
that would have occurred without policy distortions in these countries. 
  Consumers have often paid for such policies through higher prices. For example, 
U.S. consumers pay about US$0.22 per pound for raw cane sugar compared with a 2004 
average world market prices of about US$0.07 cents per pound. Consumers in the EU 
pay about triple the world market price and consumers in Japan pay nearly twice those 
levels. Consumers in the Caribbean pay higher than world market prices because of high 
duties on imports or government policies which limit imports. In Trinidad & Tobago, for 
example, sugar prices are government controlled with higher prices for retail sugar sales 
than for wholesale prices for companies which use sugar in food processing or baking. In 
Jamaica, consumers pay about triple the current world market price for raw cane sugar 
because of government import controls and high import duties.  
  The trend in world sugar prices has been down, after adjusting for inflation, with 
real sugar prices declining by about half since 1950 (Figure 7). This price decline has   20
been similar to other major primary agricultural commodities as reflected by the World 
Bank’s index of agricultural prices. The decline has been caused by a number of factors 
such as improved sugar cane yields and higher production, greater factory efficiency, and 
overproduction of sugar in highly protected markets. Slower demand growth, due to 
declining income elasticities and slower population growth rates, have also contributed to 
the price declines. World sugar prices have historically been characterized by periodic 
sharp increases followed by long periods of low or declining prices. This price volatility 
pattern has been caused, in large part, by policies in both developed and developing 
countries that isolated consumers and producers from international prices and diminished 
their price responsiveness. However, this has been changing somewhat as some 
developing countries have reformed their policies during the past two decades and their 
share of global consumption and imports has increased due to rapid population and 
income growth. This has led to greater price responsiveness by sugar producers and 
consumers, and likely reduces the severity of future price spikes. The collapse of the 
former Soviet Union also led to the abandonment of dedicated sugar imports from Cuba 
and increased trade at world market prices. Many developed countries still maintain 
highly protected sugar industries and thus contribute to the likelihood of price spikes, but 
they now account for only one-third of consumption and one-half of imports compared to 
slightly more than half of consumption and 60 percent of imports when the last sugar 
price spike occurred in 1980.  
 













About 80 percent of world sugar production and 60 percent of world sugar trade 
occurs at subsidized or protected prices. Only three major producers (Australia, Brazil, 
and Cuba) have sugar industries that produce and trade at world market price levels 
according to Borrell and Pearce (1999). These three producers account for a combined 20 
percent of world production and 40 percent of world trade. The EU, Japan and the United 
States account for 20 percent of world production and have average producer prices 


















































percent of world production and protect producers with prices that are higher than world 
market prices. The remaining 40 percent of production is in countries that either produce 
for preferential markets (Fiji, Mauritius, Philippines and many Caribbean producers) and 
thus receive higher than world market prices, or protect their domestic producers with 
policies that restrict imports to provide above-market prices to producers (Kenya). 
  India, the European Union, and Brazil are the largest sugar producers, each with 
roughly 14 percent of world production during 1999-2001 (Table 7). They are followed 
by the United States and China, which each produce about 6 percent of the world’s sugar. 
Trade is dominated by Brazil and Russia, with Brazil accounting for about one-quarter of 
world net exports and Russia accounting for about 14 percent of world net imports. The 
EU is the second largest net exporter, and it is followed by Australia, Thailand and Cuba 
which each export about 8-10 percent of the world’s total. Net imports are widely 
dispersed after Russia, with the next largest net importer accounting for less than 5 five 
percent of world imports. India is the largest sugar consumer with about 15 percent of 
world consumption, followed by the EU with 10 percent, and Brazil with 7 percent.  
 
Table 7.  Major sugar producers, net exporters and net importers, 1999-2001 average 
Producers  Net Exporters  Net Importers 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
  India    19.4    Brazil    9.3    Russia    5.2 
  EU    18.6    EU    4.2    Indonesia    1.7 
  Brazil    18.5    Australia    3.8    Japan    1.6 
  U.S.      7.9    Thailand    3.6    U.S.    1.4 
  China      7.8    Cuba    3.2    Korea, Rep.    1.2 
  Thailand      5.4    R. S. Africa    1.3    Canada    1.2 
  Mexico      5.1    Guatemala    1.1    Iran    1.0 
  Australia      4.9    Colombia    1.0    Malaysia    1.0 
  Cuba      3.8    Turkey    0.6    Algeria    0.9 
  Pakistan      3.0    Mauritius    0.5    Nigeria    0.7 
  All Other    38.9    All other  10.3    All other  20.7 
  World  133.3    World  38.9    World  36.6 
Source: USDA PS&D Database 2002. Note: Data is in raw sugar equivalents. 
 
Among the important changes that have occurred in the world sugar market in the 
past 20 years has been the shift of production and exports to low-cost producers, the shift 
of consumption and imports increasingly to developing countries, and the declining share 
of preference markets in total imports. Beginning in the 1980s, sugar production by the 
low-cost producers began to increase rapidly, with Australia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Guatemala, South Africa, and Thailand increasing their combined share of world 
production from 19 to 29 percent and their share of world exports from 24 to 52 percent 
from 1980 to 2002. Brazil had the largest increases, with its share of world production 
increasing from 7 to 17 percent between 1990 and 2003 and its share of exports 
increasing from 5 to 30 percent. At the same time, consumption and imports were shifting 
to the developing countries and these imports were at world market prices rather than at 
the high prices in protected markets in the EU and U.S. About two-thirds of world sugar 
consumption is now in developing countries, compared to one-half in 1980, and sugar 
consumption is growing by about 2.6 percent per annum in developing countries   22
compared to no growth in developed countries. Approximately one-half of world sugar 
imports are now by developing countries compared to less than one-third in 1980. These 
shifts have diminished the importance of developed country imports and the importance 
of EU and U.S. quota imports, which now account for only 7 percent of total world 
import quantities compared to 13 percent in 1982. 
The world sugar market has also been affected by the increased consumption of 
alternative caloric sweetener, high-fructose corn syrups (HFCS). This alternative 
sweetener accounts for about 40 percent of total caloric sweeteners consumption in Japan 
and nearly half in the United States (Figure 8). However, some medical researchers are 
now questioning whether HFCS is absorbed differently than sugar by the body and 
whether this difference may contribute to obesity by stifling the body's ability to feel full 
and thereby encouraging eating more. If these concerns are substantiated by research 
finding, then it could shift consumer demand back towards sugar and would have some 
impact on world sugar imports and prices. At the same time, there is increasing concern 
over the health consequences of obesity in the United States and this could reduce 
consumption of all caloric sweeteners. 
 


















Some Caribbean sugar producers may benefit from higher world market sugar 
prices while losing the benefits of access to preferential markets. If sugar trade 
preferences erode as expected, it would have some impact on world sugar prices because 
sugar producers with lower preference prices would reduce output. World sugar prices 
would increase and exports from developing countries, and some developed countries, 
would increase. The extent of the price increases would depend on how much preference 
prices erode and whether this was part of a global sugar policy reform. According to 
Sheales, et al. (1999), the full liberalization of the world sugar market would result in a 
41 percent increase in world sugar prices. Wohlgenant (1999) estimated that global 
liberalization would result in a 43 percent increase in world price, and Borrell and Pearce 
(1999) estimated that world prices would increase by 38 percent. Partial liberalization 






























Source: USDA  23
would result in smaller changes in world prices. A recent expert consultation on sugar at 
(FAO 2004) debated the extent of the price increase which would result from trade 
liberalization in light of Brazil’s potential to expand exports. Wohlgenant presented new 
simulations assuming a larger supply response from Brazil and the results support the 
conclusion that prices would rise by 30-40 percent under full trade liberalization, but 
these increases would erode over time as Brazil responded to higher prices.  
 
Policy Choices  
 
  Many Caribbean sugar producers are not profitable even at current preferential 
prices and would become even more unprofitable if preference prices eroded. However, 
some producers may benefit from higher international sugar prices which result from 
production, consumption, and trade adjustments in response to lower preference prices. 
Sugar producers that can become competitive in a more liberalized world market can 
benefit by increasing exports and taking actions to reduce costs and add value to their 
sugar production activities. Sugar producers that are not currently profitable will find it 
difficult to reduce costs or add enough value to become competitive and should use the 
transition period and adjustment programs available to diversify into other activities and 
retrain workers. Some Caribbean sugar producers will not fall clearly into either of these 
groups because they have sugar industries that have a portion that is competitive or can 
become competitive with changes. In such cases, the industries need to be rationalized or 
privatized to allow the competitive portion to continue while the uncompetitive portions 
are closed. Professional management may be a viable alternative for government-owned 
and -managed sugar industries.  
For some countries, it may be necessary to shift from a production strategy to a 
preservation strategy by converting the sugar lands into pasture lands for sheep and cattle. 
This would require much less intensive farming practices and labor than sugar and it 
would still provide both environmental protection for the land and attractive vistas for 
tourists. Sugar could still be grown on some lands, but some of the land could be shifted 
to permanent pasture. The pasture could be devoted to grazing cattle or the Barbados 
black belly sheep which is well adapted to the island environment and has superior meat 
qualities that make it very marketable to the large tourist industry or for export. The cost 
of maintaining permanent pasture would be small compared to the cost of growing sugar 
cane and losses currently incurred in supporting the sugar industry would be curtailed. 
Government land which is now in sugar could be converted to permanent pasture and 
leased to local livestock producers in much the same way that government-owned lands 
in the western United States are now leased to livestock producers. Government lease 
regulations could limit the number of animals per acre to prevent over grazing. Lands 
could be leased on a competitive bid basis or directed to small farmers as part of an 
income support program. 
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Conclusions 
 
  Sugar exporters of the Caribbean depend on sales of sugar to the European Union 
under the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol at triple the world market price and somewhat less 
dependent on the U.S. sugar import program which pays double current world market 
sugar prices. There are indications that the prices received on these preferential exports 
will decline in the future while the quantities are largely bound by international 
agreement and are not expected to decline. According to a reform proposal by the 
European Commission, the prices received for exports to the EU would decline by 39 
percent over a two year period once a reform policy is agreed.  
The consequence of likely erosion of preferences, large debts, and ongoing losses 
even on current sales to the high priced EU quota market leave many countries of the 
Caribbean with few alternatives. Since most of the sugar industries are state-owned, 
countries may continue to support their loss-making sugar industries with high levels of 
government budget support while attempting to restructure their industries to reduce costs 
and contain losses. If they cannot become competitive with lower preference prices, they 
may decide to close their industries to avoid further losses and use adjustment programs 
to retrain sugar workers for other jobs. Another alternative would be to privatize the 
industries, but this does not appear viable in many cases because of the unprofitable 
nature of the industries and widespread concerns over preference erosion. Privatizing 
some aspects of the industry may be a more viable alternative as was done in Trinidad & 
Tobago when sugar cane production was shifted entirely to private growers.  
Any of the alternatives will likely entail large government costs. If the sugar 
sector is closed, employees will need to be compensated at least as much as labor 
agreements specify and countries will need to introduce programs to deal with the social 
consequences. Trinidad is in the process of a major restructuring of its sugar sector, and 
provided an enhanced severance package to all of its 9,200 employees at a cost of TT$1.5 
billion (US$240 million). The restructuring program does not close the sector, but it 
transfers all sugar cane production to private farmers, closes one of the two mills, and 
divests of most of the non-sugar activities. The sugar factory and refinery remain in a 
state-owned corporation, but with a smaller workforce and limited scope of activities. 
Their restructuring could serve as a model for other countries, and is discussed in detail in 
the Appendix to this report. Jamaica is following the second alternative, which is to try 
and reduce operating losses while continuing to operate the sugar industry in its current 
form. This is being done by bringing in new management and better business practices, 
and appears to be partially successful. However, the government is still left with the large 
debt of the sugar companies and will need to support modernization if the sector is to 
return to profitability. It also leaves the government vulnerable to future large losses if 
the industry cannot become profitable. The Government of St. Kitts & Nevis has taken 
the decision to close the sugar industry. Government officials in Barbados appear most 
likely to follow the second alternative of supporting the sector in its current form and 
officials are exploring ways to add value such as producing energy from sugar cane or 
diversifying sugar cane lands into vegetables or livestock to meet the needs of the tourist 
hotels.  
  It is important for countries to take decisions regarding their sugar industries 
because past government inaction in dealing with sugar industry problems has allowed   25
further debts to accumulate and equipment to deteriorate. In Jamaica, for example, there 
were three reports prepared on the future of the sugar sector in 2001 with detailed 
documentation of problems and recommendations for action. However, most of these 
recommendations were not taken up. Instead, the sector continues to operate, uncertain of 
its future, with production having declined each year since 2000. In Trinidad & Tobago, a 
Tripartite Report to restructure the industry was prepared in the mid-1990s with broad 
stakeholder involvement and support, but it was not implemented with the resulting 
continued deterioration of the industry and the eventual restructuring which occurred in 
2003.  
The sugar industries of the Caribbean face severe challenges in the coming years. 
Those that survive will need to become more competitive by better managing and 
operating their industries and by adding value to sugar production in any way possible. 
One promising alternative appears to be to produce surplus energy from sugar cane 
residue (bagasse) through cogeneration. This requires the installation of high-efficiency 
boilers which can then produce surplus electricity which can be sold to the public utility.  
Other alternatives such as sugar refining and ethanol production depend on the policies 
and market opportunities available in each country. Those producers that cannot compete 
will need to devote resources to retraining workers and developing sugar lands into 
commercial, residential and agricultural uses. 
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Trinidad and Tobago Sugar Industry Restructuring Program 
 
The sugar industry in Trinidad and Tobago began a major restructuring program 
in 2003. This was preceded by no less than eight previous attempts to restructure and 
create a viable sugar industry. Despite these past efforts, by the end of 2003 the state-
owned sugar company, Caroni (1975) Limited, had accumulated current and long-term 
debt of TT$1.5 billion, debt and liabilities of TT$3.4 billion, and was making annual 
losses of about TT$500 million.
5 The company had never made a profit in 30 years of 
operation as a state-owned enterprise. With total revenues of only TT$411 million in 
2002, the Government concluded that Caroni was highly unlikely to achieve viability in 
the foreseeable future and that the industry urgently needed to be restructured.  
  Prior to the restructuring, Caroni (1975) Limited employed approximately 9,200 
persons, owned 77,000 acres of land (of which 29,000 were used for sugar cane 
production), refined sugar, and produced sugar, rum, dairy, beef, citrus and rice. The 
major elements of the restructuring were the creation of three new state-owned 
companies; retaining Caroni (1975) Limited to manage the restructuring as a non-trading 
company; providing a separation package to all employees; removing all debt and 
liabilities from Caroni; and transferring Caroni lands to the Government. These lands 
were to be leased to farmers for sugar cane production or developed for other uses. 
  The restructuring plan involved closing one of the two sugar factories, shifting all 
cane production to farmers, divesting of the non-sugar activities, and requiring all new 
business activities to be private sector driven. All debts and liabilities and all lands owned 
by Caroni were transferred to the government. All employees were given a separation 
package and retraining budgets. The restructured sugar company was to mill sugar cane 
produced in Trinidad and export it to the EU to meet its quota. Any additional sugar 
produced beyond the EU quota would be used to meet domestic demand. The new 
company would import raw sugar duty-free from other countries in the CARICOM 
trading area (primarily Guyana) and refine it to satisfy domestic demand or export it 
within the CARICOM region. This activity would benefit from the protection of the 40 
percent Common External Tariff (CET) on imports of refined sugar from outside 
CARICOM. The restructuring was expected to result in a loss of jobs in the initial years, 
but an increase in jobs over the longer-term as employees were retrained and new jobs 
created as lands not used for sugar production were developed for commercial and 
residential use. 
All employees of Caroni were separated from the company and given a Voluntary 
Separation of Employment Package (VSEP), retraining opportunities, and unspecified 
future preferential treatment to acquire some of the Caroni assets, bungalows, and 
agricultural land for use in their own businesses or for personal use. Prior to the 
restructuring, there were about 8,100 daily-paid field and factory workers and 1,100 
monthly-paid workers. The cost of the VSEP was estimated at TT$730.9 million, of 
which TT$299.5 million was allocated to monthly-paid workers and TT$431.4 million 
                                                 
5 In 2003, 6.25TT$ equal US$1.0.   29
was allocated to daily-paid workers. The average VSEP benefit was about TT$54,600 for 
daily-paid workers, and TT$272,000 for monthly-paid workers. The benefit obligations 
were specified by the Retrenchment and Severance Benefits Act (RSBA) No. 32 of 1985 
based on time-in-service and pay rate. Under this Act a person with 18 years service, for 
example, would be entitled to 30.5 months pay (Appendix IV, page 3). An enhanced 
benefit package was eventually agreed which provided a 30 percent enhancement to the 
Benefits Act and made some other allowances for age. The average VSEP benefit to 
daily-paid workers was equal to 2 years of annual pay and the average for monthly-paid 
workers was about 4.7 years of annual pay. Each worker was also given a retraining 
budget of up to TT$4,000 for daily-paid and up to TT$9,000 for monthly-paid workers 
for approved training. In addition, all employees and their spouses were given computer 
literacy training at a cost of TT$200 per person. If the employee and spouse did not want 
to take the computer literacy training, they could designate one child to receive the 
training. Counseling and financial advisory services were provided to all employees. The 
training programs have been taken-up by many of the former employees and there were 
(as of April 2004) 1,200 daily-paid and 500 monthly-paid former staff in approved 
training programs. Others were waiting for training, but could not be accommodated 
because of the large number of staff eligible for training and the limited number of 
qualified trainers. Many of the workers had skills which were not certified (such as 
welding) and only needed limited additional training to be certified. The reaction of the 
former employees of Caroni was mixed, but generally favorable. The senior monthly-
paid workers were the least satisfied with the VSEP while many of the daily-paid workers 
were very satisfied with the VSEP. Of the 7,900 daily-paid workers, about 3,500 were 
expected to be retrained with marketable skills. The entire cost of the restructuring 
program was estimated at TT$1.5 billion. 
The three new companies created were: the Sugar Manufacturing Company Limited 
(SMCL), the Estates Management Business Development Company (EMBD), and the 
Rum distillers of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (RDTT).  EMBD was to provide the 
security for the vacated lands and oversee their return to the Government. It was also to 
develop some lands for commercial and residential use and ensure that the governments 
land use policy was followed. EMBD was mandated to conduct a land capability survey. 
RDTT was to take over rum production and seek an investor for ongoing operations. The 
Company was considered a viable candidate for privatization because of a large stock of 
aged rum which had a ready market. Other assets of Caroni were to be sold by the 
Ministry of Finance, Divestment Secretariate, or the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, and 
Marine Resources (MALMR). These assets included the Sugarcane Feed Center, 
livestock, citrus groves, the rice project, dairy operation, and the aquaculture project. 
Certain services previously provided by Caroni, such as the cane quality control program, 
environmental regulations, roadway and culvert repair, scale calibration and monitoring, 
and coordination of sugar cane hauling were transferred to the MALMR. Management of 
certain facilities such as social clubs, schools, and medical centers were awarded to local 
authorities or organizations. As of January 2004, EMBD had received 12,900 requests for 
agricultural and residential lands. 
  The Sugar Manufacturing Company Limited was established in August 2003 
using transitional staff from Caroni and the sugar mill and refinery at St. Madeleine. The 
second mill was closed and used to provide parts and training facilities for the remaining   30
staff and mill. The Company was to be the State appointed miller of sugar cane and to be 
the primary source of refined sugar for local consumption. Since all Caroni employees 
were separated and given the VSEP, the new Company was free to hire only those 
employees with the skills required. Wages were determined by existing labor agreements 
that applied to sugar workers as well as workers in other sectors. About 500 of the former 
employees were hired back by the new Company. The new Company no longer produced 
sugar cane, but instead purchased cane from 6,000 private cane growers producing under 
contract using owned lands or leased government lands. A fixed price of TT$180/ton was 
to be paid per ton of cane, with the mandate to implement a cane quality payment system. 
   The Company could import raw cane sugar for refining or refined sugar for sale to 
the domestic market. Production in excess of the EU quota of about 55,000 tons was not 
profitable given the cost structure and the company planed to produce only the amount of 
sugar that could be sold to the EU. The U.S. quota of 7,372 tons would go unfilled 
because it could not be satisfied profitably. Company officials believed the U.S. quota 
would not be forfeited if it went unfilled. The viability of the restructured sugar company 
depended on four factors:  i) access to the EU quota and the high prices available, ii) the 
protection afforded by the CARICOM Common External Tariff (CET) of 40 percent 
which must be paid on raw or refined sugar from outside the region, and iii) the 
protection afforded in the domestic market by high government-set wholesale and retail 
sugar prices, and iv) the ability of the Company to control costs. Without the high prices 
for EU quota sugar, domestic sugar cane production would not be viable. Even after 
restructuring, high cane prices have been maintained as government policy, with farmers 
receiving TT$180/ton (US$30/ton), which was double that of low-cost producer 
Australia. At such high prices, exports to the U.S. quota market were not profitable even 
though U.S. quota prices were nearly three times the 2004 world market price. Sugar 
cane accounted for 75 percent of total raw sugar production costs. Other costs had been 
reduced because the Company had reduced its work force to 500 workers. Given high 
costs, the Company planned to produce only the amount of raw cane sugar that could be 
exported to the EU under quota, which was about 55,000 tons under the EU’s Sugar 
Protocol and Special Preference Sugar programs.  
  The CET of 40 percent provided an opportunity for SMCL to profitably import 
raw sugar from within CARICOM and export refined sugar to CARICOM countries. The 
total demand for refined sugar imports within the CARICOM countries was 
approximately 200,000 tons and most of this was not being met by CARICOM exports 
because of the lack of sugar refining capacity. Under such condition, countries were 
granted a CET wavier to import from outside CARICOM. The Company planned to 
expand refining capacity to meet this demand. The Companies’ refinery had a name-plate 
capacity to produce 80,000 tons of refined sugar and the refinery would be upgraded and 
expanded. If raw cane sugar was not available for import from CARICOM countries, 
then the Company would apply for a CET wavier and import from other raw sugar 
exporters such as Brazil.  
  Sugar prices in Trinidad and Tobago were regulated with very high prices to retail 
consumers and lower (but still well above world market) wholesale prices to 
manufactures of products using sugar. This provided a lucrative market opportunity for 
both manufactures and SMCL. The ex-warehouse price of refined sugar to manufactures 
was equal to the most recent 30 day average International Sugar Organization price plus a   31
16 percent allowance for storage and handling--currently TT$4,600 per ton after allowing 
for the CET of 40 percent. The government-regulated retail refined sugar price was more 
than double that at TT$11,000 per ton. Sugar consumption by manufactures was 46,000 
tons and retail consumption was 9,000 tons. Brown sugar consumption was an additional 
14,000 tons bringing total domestic consumption to 69,000 tons. The monopoly on 
imports by Caroni was removed in 2002 and that led to a 25 percent loss of market share 
to the private sector that had better marketing and distribution. The government is 
reportedly considering re-establishing the monopoly to the Company. Without the 
monopoly, the company would continue to lose market share as private sector companies 
import refined sugar and package and distribute to manufactures and retailers. 
  The restructuring of the sugar sector came after 30 years of unprofitable operation 
by the state-owned sugar company. It may provide a useful model for other countries 
facing similarly unprofitable sugar sectors. The government officials in charge of the 
restructuring stress the importance of developing an initial plan that can be effectively 
defended against the inevitable criticism. Once the plan is announced, the timetable 
should be followed. It is important to meet with all affected parties and provide detailed 
information on the plan. Implementation should be done quickly so that employees can 
retrain and return to productive employment. Counseling and financial advice should be 
given to ease the transition. The cost of the entire restructuring program was high at 
TT$1.5 billion, however it was justified by the annual loss of TT$500 million per year 
from ongoing operations. The redistribution of sugar lands to other commercial and 
residential uses could partially offset the debts and liabilities of the sugar company, and 
provide a stronger tax base for the future. On balance, the restructuring was a success and 
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